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9BUILDING A WAY TO THE CITY? –  
ASKING ABOUT OBJECTS, CONDITIONS, 
AND ESSENCE AS A METHODOLOGY FOR 
APPROACHING THE URBAN1
Mark Vacher
An Attempt to Sense what Hides in a Question
The perspectives under exploration here are inspired by a lecture by 
Heidegger. However, they were not, originally, meant to be used for the 
study of cities, but they emerge from his concern with technology. The 
reason why I am applying Heidegger’s perspective on technology to an 
analysis of cities is not that I consider cities to be technologies, although they 
could certainly be viewed as such. What I want to pursue is his methodology.
In his lecture, Heidegger sets out to explore technology not as something 
technological, but as a powerful essence that pervades everything we can 
think of as such.2 He warns us that technology represents »a supreme dan-
ger« placing mankind at »the very brink of a precipitous fall«.3 The danger 
he describes lies in mistaking the essence of technology for the technological 
devices we can manipulate and control. In doing this, he warns, we risk dis-
regarding how we are becoming increasingly dependent on, and controlled 
by, technology.
Despite its ominous ring, Heidegger’s lecture does not call for a dismiss-
al of technology nor does it suggest alternatives to contemporary practices 
involving technology. What he aims at is not to change technology, but »to 
experience the technological within its own bounds«4 by »preparing a free 
relationship to it«.5 In other words, he wants to provide a position free from 
illusions of mastery and dominance from which technology, instead of repre-
1 I would like to thank cultural anthropologist Sebastian Topp for the invitation to develop 
and elaborate my thoughts on Heidegger’s analysis of technology in relation to urban an-
thropology. I also want to thank ethnologists Marie Riegels Melchior, Marie Sandberg and 
Mette Kamille Birck for productive sparring and critical comments on earlier drafts. Last 
but not least, I owe a huge thanks to cultural analyst Drew Thilmany for helping me de-
velop the structure of the paper and for critically challenging the analysis.
2 Martin Heidegger: The Question Concerning Technology, and Other Essays. New York/
London 1983 [1954], p. 6.
3 Ibid., p. 26–27.
4 Ibid., p. 4.
5 Ibid., p. 3.
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senting a potential threat, can be encountered as a ›saving power‹ enhancing 
the lives of its users.6
My concern with the city has similarities to Heidegger’s concern with tech-
nology. Firstly, cities are also often regarded as entities conceived, designed, 
and produced by humankind. Secondly, they also represent endangering 
forces that control and limit the lives of people who live in them. Thirdly, like 
the dark side of technology mentioned by Heidegger, the response to urban 
perils like congestion, pollution, crime, and decay, is often an attempt to mas-
ter the phenomena in question as if they were subject to specific rules and 
submitted to specific logics of domination. This is not to say that visions or 
solutions are irrelevant or dispensable. The problem is, as I will demonstrate, 
that visions and solutions (like plans, policies, and programs) from their very 
outset tend to alter the constitution of what they are intended to be visions 
›of‹ and solutions ›for‹.
Inspired by Heidegger, I will explore whether there is a dimension of the city 
we do not sense, not because it is absent, but because it is being drowned out 
by attempts to plan, manipulate, and master.
Thus, what I set out to do is prepare a free relationship with the city in order 
to experience it within its own bounds.7 What these bounds are, like anything 
else, is open for questioning. However, according to Heidegger, what they 
do as bounds can be determined quite precisely: they set boundaries. These 
boundaries constitute contours, signs, and traces of what is being confined 
within or bound by them.8 Thus, ›the bounds of the city‹ can be determined 
as ›the conditions by which the city emerges as a city‹. Or, as Heidegger puts 
it: »With the bounds the thing does not stop; rather from out of them it begins 
to be what, after production, it will be«.9 My hope is that what emerges from 
questioning will present, if not a saving power, then perhaps an increased 
attention to the forces shaping the cities we live in.
Whose Bounds?
In January 1997, two days after arriving in Marseille, I took a picture10 show-
ing the view from a famous landmark overlooking the city: cathedral Notre 
Dame de la Garde (Ill. 1). The city was lying right before me, but standing 
where I did to take the picture, I felt distanced and very far away from what I 
had come to study.11 After a while, I went down from Notre Dame de la Garde 
6 Ibid., p. 28.
7 Ibid., p. 4.
8 Ibid., p. 8.
9 Ibid.
10 The original picture has been lost. The present one was taken 20 years later from the 
same vantage point by my friend and local resident Brigitte Fabre.
11 The fieldwork I set out to conduct in 1997 was the first in a line of ethnographic enquir-
ies that later became the empirical foundation for a MA thesis and a Ph.D. dissertation 
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and into the city, where I was absorbed in a swirl of people, cars, buildings, 
sounds, and smells.
The two experiences just described are clearly very different, but the city, I 
am convinced, is the same.12 If the city is the same, then what is the city, and 
what constitutes the difference between the ways in which it appears?
According to urban anthropologists Edwin Eames and Judith Goode, the dif-
ference is a matter of scale and perspective. In 1977, they have published 
›Anthropology of the City: an introduction to urban anthropology‹.13 What
they called for was an approach to the city that seeks to grasp it as an object
of study in itself rather than presenting it as a vaguely defined context for
studies of local neighborhoods, minorities, or institutions located within it. To
Eames and Goode what constitutes a city are »components and units« that
can be pieced together to provide a representation of the city as a whole.14
In other words, what makes my two experiences with Marseille differ has
within urban anthropology, see Mark Vacher: Byen og antropologien. MA Thesis. Aarhus 
1999; Mark Vacher: Urban transit: En antropologisk analyse af gennemrejsendes indfly-
delse på urban form og fremtræden i den franske havneby Marseille. PhD thesis. Copen-
hagen 2005.
12 Over the years, I have returned to Notre Dame de la Garde several times and despite a 
new building here and there, I have always been able to recognize the city before me as 
Marseille.
13 Edwin Eames/Judith Goode: Anthropology of the City: An Introduction to Urban Anthro-
pology. Prentice-Hall 1977.
14 Ibid., p. 260; »Only if the unique physical, demographic, and ecological characteristics of 
the city receive primary emphasis, or if the effects of migrants on the city as an entity are 
Ill. 1: Marseille in a picture. Photo: Brigitte Fabre
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nothing to do with the city, but with my positioning and with the way, I stitch 
and piece it together.
Although understanding the city as an assembly of parts may at first glance 
seem like a straightforward approach to exploring what the city is, trying to 
reach the whole from its parts and vice versa soon presents us with a range 
of challenges. What constitutes the parts and how do they relate to each oth-
er? Is it possible to trace the city as a whole through its parts? Is a city in 
reality just a set of correlations stitched together from distant observations 
and experiences of absorption?
Finally, if the differences have nothing to do with the city, but depend on the 
way I approach it, the way the city emerges remains a matter of mastery and 
skills. In other words, the bounds from which the city emerges do not belong 
to the city, but to me.15
As already mentioned, my intention is not to suggest new visions or solutions 
for mastering a city. My aim is not to improve the ways we stitch or piece 
the city together. What I want, with the help of Heidegger, is to find a way 
to experience the city, not as my construction, but within its own bounds. In 
order to achieve this, he argues, we have to rethink our approach to the city 
(or in his case technology). To Heidegger this does not imply changing the 
way in which we experience what is bound. Instead, we have to change our 
approach to experience itself: we have to question it.
Building a Way
›Questioning builds a way.‹16 This ›way‹  – as a path, a trajectory, a line of 
thought – can not only take us through landscapes that expose us to new and 
different perspectives, but also create room for unexpected encounters with 
what we think we already know on new terms.
If we want to question what we experience when experiencing a city, we 
can start by asking ›What makes it an experience?‹. Following Heidegger, 
by asking this question we are articulating an important distinction, namely 
between ›the city‹ and ›what makes it an experience?‹. Thus, as he states in 
the case of technology, it is important to understand that: »Technology [as 
we experience it] is not equivalent to the essence of technology.«17 Heid-
explored, can these studies be viewed as anthropology of the city«. Ibid., p. 33 italics in 
original.
15 This line of thought has led the anthropologist Clyde Mitchell to dismiss the idea of do-
ing anthropology of cities. What he rejects is not that the city constitutes an entity. The 
problem is that the city represents »a vastly complex set of human activities and interac-
tions about which any one observer can only appreciate a limited part«, see Clyde Mitch-
ell: Cities, Society, and Social Perception. Oxford 1987, p. 8. In other words, the city is too 
big and too complex to grasp as an entity within the bounds of anthropology.
16 Heidegger, as in fn. 2, p. 3.
17 Ibid.
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egger explains this distinction through the following analogy: »When we are 
seeking the essence of ›tree‹ we have to become aware that which pervades 
every tree, as tree, is not itself a tree that can be encountered among all 
other trees.«18
In other words, we can examine every tree in every forest on the planet, 
dissect the tiniest detectable part, or carve out the innermost fiber of the 
largest trunk, without ever uncovering the essence, or ›treeness‹, of the tree. 
The same, I argue, goes for the city. Looking for what makes the city a city as 
a part among parts is like cutting up a tree to find its ›treeness‹.
Following Heidegger, the essence of a city cannot be equated with experienc-
ing its bits and pieces. This, I think, more than size or complexity, is one of the 
reasons why attempts to compose a valid concept of the city from units and 
parts never really manages to capture the city as a whole.19 However, if the 
essence of a city is neither a part nor an experience thereof, what is it and 
are there ways to uncover it?
Identifying what to ask about
To Heidegger the path towards uncovering the essence of a phenomenon 
lies in the method of questioning. Thus, in our case, we should remember 
to examine not only what we ask about when asking about the city, but also 
how we ask. So far, our questioning has led us to the concept of the city ›as 
a whole made up of parts‹. This approach, says Heidegger, has implications 
for the outcome of our questioning. When we ask about ›basic components, 
units‹, or ›parts‹, we are, as I have argued confining the city within certain 
bounds. In order to be made of parts, what we think of as parts have to be 
pieces of some kind of totality and whatever emerges has no other option 
than to take on the shape of such a totality. Thus, by asking about parts we 
impose bounds that force the city to become an entity and to be explored as 
such.20
It seems that, if we want to include ›that which pervades‹ the city in our 
inquiry, we have to develop an alternative to approaching it as a totality con-
18 Ibid.
19 Mitchell, as in fn. 15.
20 In his inspiring paper ›The Gestalt of the Urban Imaginary‹, the German anthropologist 
Rolf Lindner turns this perspective upside down. Inspired by Max Wertheimer’s Gestalt 
theory, Lindner traces notions of specific cities like Berlin, Vienna, New York, Boston, Los 
Angeles and Chicago in literary characters. According to Lindner: »The plausibility of a 
literary figure is a fine indicator of what is imaginable and above all what is unimagina-
ble with regard to a particular city«, see Rolf Lindner: The Gestalt of the Urban Imaginary. 
In: Urban Mindscapes of Europe 23 (2006), p. 39. Lindner’s approach definitely points to 
individual cities as being of their own and individual kind. Furthermore, his reference to 
the French anthropologist Pierre Sansot, who defines the imaginary as the reverie of the 
real (see ibid., p. 36), also indicates that he sees the city as a reality existing beyond the 
imagined.
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sisting of parts. The challenge, however, is not only that we have to examine 
the city in a different way, but, also, that what we seek to examine ›is not itself 
a city that can be encountered among all other cities‹.21
To summarize, what we see when we are looking at a city is not and cannot 
be its essence. We see people, cars, buildings, streets, historical places, cul-
tural stereotypes, circulation, exchange, etc., but none of this can be isolated 
as the essence of the city. However, this does not imply that the essence is 
not there! In fact, like the ›treeness‹ of trees, the essence of the city has to be 
present in every version of it.
Taking a Picture of Essence
To explore these aspects further, let us revisit the concrete version of a city 
I presented in the picture of Marseille. As have already mentioned, I took a 
picture of it in 1997. I took it with a camera, a device that allowed me to cap-
ture the city as a motif. This is what I asked my friend to repeat in 2017 – to 
recapture the city. Of course, the picture reveals a lot about us (my instruc-
tions and her ability to use a camera), but as a version of the city it also re-
veals something about the city itself. What it reveals is the city’s ability to let 
itself be captured like this in a picture.22 In order to become this particular 
motif, the city had to possess certain qualities when my friend photographed 
it. Among others, it had to lie before her and to stand out in front of her. It had 
to emerge in the given way in order to enter the picture.
Unlike looking at the city as parts that produce a whole or vice versa, the 
version of the city that emerges in the picture ›becomes what it is, because 
it could not help but emerge as such‹. In this sense, the city would not have 
been forced to become something it might not necessarily be. Rather it would 
have been (re)captured or uncovered as something that, in its own right, it 
could not escape being when put in front of an optic lens.
The essence of the city in the picture is not dependent on the city being a 
motif or being in a picture at all, nor is it visible as such. Nevertheless, I will 
argue, we sense a trace of it within the picture. The trace has to do with ›the 
way‹ the city emerges before us. Therefore, as a next step in our questioning, 
we will try to follow the trace by examining this particular way further.
21 Heidegger, as in fn. 18.
22 This is not to say that every city allows itself to be captured (or recaptured) in a picture 
or that photography is a privileged way of producing versions of cities. But, following 
Heidegger, perceiving the mentioned picture as a picture of Marseille does make it a ver-
sion of it and thus pervades it with the essence of the city.
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Questioning the City as Objects
When something lies before us or opposes us, we call it an ›object‹. Accord-
ing to its etymology, the word object dates back to the late 14th century and 
has the following connotations:
›tangible thing, something perceived or presented to the senses‹, from 
Medieval Latin objectum ›thing put before‹ (the mind or sight), noun 
use of neuter of Latin objectus ›lying before, opposite‹ (as a noun in 
classical Latin, ›charges, accusations‹), past participle of obicere ›to 
present, oppose, cast in the way of‹, from ob ›against‹ (see ob-) + iacere 
›to throw‹ (see jet (v.)). Sense of ›thing aimed at‹ is late 14th century. No 
object ›not a thing regarded as important‹ is from 1782. As an adjective, 
›presented to the senses‹, from late 14th century. Object lesson ›instruc-
tion conveyed by examination of a material object‹ is from 1831.23
Following this definition, objects are ›everything that can be perceived or 
presented to the senses or the mind‹. From the picture of Marseille, we can 
see that this particular version of the city is capable of being an object. Al-
though at first glance this seems very tangible, it also addresses the trace 
of a pervading essence we have already come across in our questioning. If 
we examine the definition carefully, we discover that an object becomes an 
object by being:
›put before‹, ›lying before‹, ›opposing‹, ›cast in the way of‹, or ›thrown in front 
of‹ someone.
Here, a precondition for the emergence of objects becomes apparent: ›for 
an object to be an object there must be distance and opposition between the 
object and a specific other‹. Furthermore, if an object is a ›thing aimed at‹ 
and ›regarded important‹, then this precondition is ›imposed by‹ or ›imposed 
on someone‹. The imposition of ›lying before somebody‹ is exactly how Mar-
seille stands out and opposes us as a city in the picture.
As an object, the city is not only confined in a perceivable and presenta-
ble form, it is also confined within relationships of opposition and distance. 
Without this confinement, the city in the picture would not be capable of 
appearing as an object, a version of what it is.
Questioning the city as object relations
How does this bring us closer to uncovering the essence of the city? At first 
sight, what I have argued so far seems tautological: It is a city, if it stands out 
to someone as a city!
However, keeping Heidegger’s approach to questioning in mind, we can now 
begin asking a number of uncovering questions. Emerging from the object 
23 Online Etymology Dictionary: Object. 2001–2018. URL: https://www.etymonline.com/word/
object.
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relation we can ask: How, to whom, and as what does the city stand out as a 
city?
According to the French philosopher Henri Lefebvre, for perceptions to 
stand out as something implies a decryption (or ›bounding‹ in Heidegger’s 
terms).24 This decryption from perception to ›perception of something‹, he 
argues, is how »the imagination seeks to change and appropriate« that which 
is being perceived.25 Thus, the perceived opposition is transformed from a 
relation ›between the perceiver and the perceived‹ into an identified object 
›conceived as a city that possesses its own shape and appearance‹. In oth-
er words, like the treeness of trees is thrown into specific shapes (trunks,
leaves, roots, forests etc.), so is the essence of the city when standing out
to someone as a city. As an example of how decryption impacts the ways in
which cities stand out as cities, I introduce what Lefebvre refers to as the
conceivers of space.26
Conceivers
Conceivers are those who envision, plan, and design. We know them as ar-
chitects, social engineers, and urban planners. Their tools consist of maps, 
pencils, rulers, and computers, and their practices often involve highly 
transformative skills. They conceive through metaphors, metonymies, and by 
changing scales from maps and models.
What they envision, plan, and design are not cities, but visions, plans, and 
designs for cities. They experience distance from and opposition (object re-
lation) to the city when seeking out what is missing or needs to be added. 
The city they relate to, points towards a city somewhere ahead of them, pre-
senting the present city as unfulfilled, incomplete, and an opportunity for 
creative and transformative action.27
As conceivers, their perceptions are deciphered, changed, and appropriated 
(become something)28 in contrast to a future version of the present city. In 
this relationship between the city and the perceiver, what gets the most at-
tention is the future. It is pursued, designed, and prepared by the perceiver 
to be conceived first in tangible concepts, models, and renderings and 
then realized as a completion of the incomplete present.29
24 Henri Lefebvre: The Production of Space. Oxford 1991 [1974]; Heidegger, as in fn. 2, p. 4; 8.
25 Lefebvre, as in fn. 24, p. 39.
26 Ibid., p. 38.
27 Michel de Certeau, who presents the architect as someone who sees a challenge or an 
opportunity, transforms the existing, and then moves on, makes a similar point. See 
Michel de Certeau: The Practice of Everyday Life. Berkeley/Los Angeles 1984, p. 127.
28 Lefebvre, as in fn. 25.
29 La Cité Radieuse in Marseille designed by the Swiss architect Le Corbusier, completed 
in 1952, and inscribed as UNESCO world heritage in 2016 is an iconic example of a mod-
ernist vision for the future city. See Cité Radieuse: Unité d’Habitation. Le Corbusier. Mar-
seille 2018. URL: http://wwww.marseille-citeradieuse.org/.
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However, along with the future comes the past, first and foremost in the 
shape of the perceiver’s experience. In the cases of architects, social engi-
neers, and urban planners, their education and training will most likely in-
fluence how their perceptions are decrypted and turned into conceptions. 
Another, and maybe less obvious, way the decryption of perceptions can be 
flavored by the past is when it is attributed to what the German cultural 
analyst Walter Benjamin labeled ›weak messianic power‹. This, he argues, 
happens when moral and cultural values displayed in past events are used 
as guidelines for explaining the nature of the present and as a compass for 
navigating the future30 – in other words, when the future is envisioned as a 
legacy of a defining past.31
Thus, the shape and appearance of the city as it appears before the conceiv-
er as an object is flavored not only by his or her perception of it, but also by 
decryption through imagined futures and experienced or ›messianic‹ pasts.32 
Lefebvre’s example supports our analysis of the city so far by confirming the 
hypothesis that an object is: 1) inseparably related to someone perceiving it 
as an object, and 2) a version of something, which is not itself an object. Just 
as importantly, it concretizes the analysis by providing an empirical manifes-
tation of not only what stands out as an object, but also the entire relation, 
including someone the object gets to stand out before.
Above, the exploration of the object relation to the city has been limited to a 
very specific group of professionals who represent a particular orientation 
towards the city. However, if we continue down the path laid out by Heideg-
ger, the discoveries we have made by applying Lefebvre’s perspective invite 
us to explore other ways of entering into an object relation with the city. 
Of course, this exploration can never be exhaustive, but as we shall see in 
the following, there are important questions to be formulated by comparing 
Lefebvre’s conceivers to other concrete approaches to the city as an object.
30 Walter Benjamin: On the Concept of History. Cambridge/London 2009 [1940], p. II.
31 In Marseille a clear example of the city’s past becoming an inspiration for futurist design 
can be experienced at Le Mucem (The Museum of European and Mediterranean Civiliza-
tions) designed by the local architect Rudy Ricciotti. The physical location as well as the 
thematic framing relates strongly to Marseille being an ancient European and Mediter-
ranean port and a historical maritime gate to the entire world. See Mucem. 11. 10. 2018. 
URL: http://www.mucem.org/le-mucem.
32 For an extensive analysis of realized and unrealized plans and visions for Marseille and 
their impact on ›the urban grammar‹ see ›La grammaire d’une ville‹ by geographer Mar-
cel Roncayolo. Marcel Roncayolo: Les grammaires d’yune ville. Paris 1996; Lefebvre, as in 
fn. 24; Benjamin, as in fn. 30.
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Janitors
When we visit the official website of the city of Marseille, we find references 
to another category of people who relate to the city as a challenge put in 
front of them.33 They are the civil servants or janitors of the city.
Janitors oversee, survey, and read the city as an entity to be maintained and 
protected. We know them as police officers, road and construction workers, 
emergency service providers, garbage collectors, social workers, park offi-
cials, etc.
Their tools consist of repair kits, rescue equipment, and control devices and 
their practices are often of a preventive, preserving, or renovating nature. 
Although they relate to the city as an entity, this is not how it stands out to 
the janitors. What they register, perceive and respond to are deviations and 
anomalies. Deviations and anomalies are hard to predict, hard to control, and 
tend to escalate if they are unnoticed or ignored. Therefore, janitors have to 
stay on guard, be alert, and be prepared. To stay ahead of challenges, what 
they oversee, maintain and protect is often broken down into manageable 
sectors, systems, standards, shifts, schedules, and procedures.
Unlike the conceivers who relate to the city through scalable metaphors or 
metonymies, janitors tend to act on a one-to-one scale with their observa-
tions. They stuff, control, repair, remove, prevent, clean and rescue on the 
spot. The successful outcome of their relations to the city as an object con-
sists of ›a dissolution of objects‹. They remove graffiti, garbage, repair dam-
age, prevent terrorist attacks, and sweep up dead leaves, dead bodies, chew-
ing gum, and dog feces. The janitors’ aim is not to transform the city into a 
new version of itself, but rather to make sure that it stays in shape and in 
order. In that sense, the horizon by which the janitors decrypt their percep-
tions is of an adverbial nature. The city should be orderly, livable, predictable, 
organized, clean, safe and normal. It should constitute a safe and clean en-
vironment, in which traffic flows safely and where lives and businesses can 
flourish successfully.
Since janitors maintain the city according to adverbial standards (good 
enough, clean enough, safe enough, smooth enough, etc.) the temporal ori-
entation folded into what stands out before them as objects differs from 
that standing out to the conceivers. While the full and complete city through 
which the conceivers’ perceptions are deciphered into objects is located in 
a conceived future (which as argued by Benjamin may draw on the past), 
the temporality folded into the complete city before the janitors appears as 
a race against erosion and decay. Janitors repair, restore, reinstall, and rees-
tablish. In that sense, janitors tend to perceive objects with reference not to 
33 Mairie: Administration de la commune. Le fonctionnement. Marseille 2018. 11. 10. 2018. 
URL: http://mairie.marseille.fr/administration-de-la-commune/le-fonctionnement.
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an ideal future, but to an authentic order under constant threat from under-
mining forces.34
Thus, like in Lefebvre’s example, the objects standing out to the janitors are 
also determined by a specific decryption and a version of something, which 
is not itself an object. In the janitors’ case, this something emerges as a per-
ceived absence of order. Objects become objects by deviating in relation to 
the anticipated order of the city. The absence of this order is not only per-
ceived, but also meticulously searched for in fragments and details. It is the 
search for, as much as the perception of, this absence that constitutes the 
decryption through which the city appears to the janitors.
Conquerors
The object relations discussed so far, all share references to ideal versions 
of cities in the light of which the perceived city appears incomplete or dam-
aged. This raises the question whether this is the case in all object relations 
or if there are ways of decrypting perceptions that allow a city to enter into 
an object relation as a complete version of itself.
As a final example of object relations, I will introduce a category of people 
who approach the city as the one and only authentic version of itself. Unlike 
conceivers and janitors, they are not there to build, develop, maintain, or pro-
tect. What these people seek out in object relations is a tangible reward for 
investing time, energy and resources. For them, objects are a confirmation 
not only of the city’s presence, but also of their own presence in an authen-
tic moment. Filled with expectations, this category of people purposefully 
engages in object relations with the city with the ambition of conquering it.
Conquerors approach cities from the outside. They are arrivers, foreigners, 
and newcomers who take in and consume the city as a new place. They come 
by different means: by air, by sea, and by land. They come in different ver-
sions: as immigrants, as hostile invaders, as tourists. The city is a new experi-
ence to them, even if the city itself is very old. Unlike conceivers and janitors, 
distance and opposition are not installed by conquerors in the process of 
engaging with the city as an object: ›they are the very outset‹. As a destina-
tion, the city is something out there to be encountered, experienced, taken, 
34 Janitors mostly carry out their tasks in modest anonymity, but depending on the nature 
of the undermining forces, their involvement with the city may put them in situations de-
manding extraordinary bravery and heroic actions within the call of duty. A famous ex-
ample of heroic janitors are the New York fire fighters, many of whom lost their lives in 
the line of duty during the 9/11 attack in 2001. In Marseille, Bishop Belsunce is an exam-
ple of a celebrated janitor. Unlike other wealthy citizens and members of the nobility, he 
stayed behind to help the poor and the sick during The Great Plague of Marseille in 1720, 
which killed 100 000 people in the city and the surrounding areas. See Roger Duchêne/
Jean Contrucci: Marseille, 26 000 ans d’histoire. Fayard 1998. To honor his deeds, the cit-
izens of Marseille later renamed the former Cours Royale in the center of town Cours 
Belsunce. See Vacher, as in fn. 11.
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and grasped. In other words, it is not to be invented or detected in reference 
to something else – it already is that something else.
Approaching the city from the outside makes the conqueror’s arrival a spec-
tacular event in regards to the object condition. Often, what appears in front 
of the conqueror gets to manifest itself as crucial entry points, behind which 
the city is waiting to be taken. Some of these entry points, like airports, train 
stations, harbor terminals, and immigration offices, may require documents 
and proof of the conqueror’s identity and intentions.35 Others, like city walls 
or moats, have to be climbed unnoticed or taken by force.
Although a successful penetration of the boundaries may take the conquer-
ors to inside the city, it does not lead to absorption or dissolving of the object 
relation. To some conquerors, like immigrants, this may cause frustration and 
anxiety,36 while to other conquerors, like tourists, maintaining an object rela-
tion to the city almost seems to be the main goal of their engagement.37
Again, unlike conceivers and janitors, conquerors are rarely celebrated as 
heroes in the city where they carry out their activities. Nevertheless, they 
often contribute more to the city’s prosperity than they take away. A city can 
make a fortune by manifesting itself in conquerable objects like souvenirs, 
consumable specialties, and other commodities. What makes objects prof-
itable includes not only the objects to be conquered, but the entire object 
relation: the means of transportation bringing the conquerors to the objects, 
the markets, the ATMs, etc., but also the sanctuaries, hotels, and resorts in 
which they prepare their strategies before and rest after a day of conquest. 
In other words, all the objects, services and facilities enabling the conquerors 
to fulfill their desires.
Of course, the conquest of cities differs from one conqueror to another. Some 
conquer by frontal raids, others from below. Some are on a tight budget, while 
others have almost limitless resources. For some, conquering is a life-risk-
ing act, for others, it may be part of a pleasant holiday activity. Finally, some 
conquerors leave the city in ashes, while others contribute to its growth and 
35 This control is typically undertaken by janitors.
36 In Marseille, the material manifestation of insecure newcomers can be found in the so-
called ›transit areas‹ located close to the old harbor. See Emile Témime: Marseille tran-
sit: les passagers de Belsunce. Paris 1995. Here different ›vagues migratories‹ (waves of 
migrants) have found their first shelter in a new city among fellow countrymen, who 
have made a living out of hosting »the human wrecks of war and persecution elsewhere« 
floating ashore on coast of Marseille. See Albert Londres: Marseille, porte du sud. Paris 
2000 [1927]. In these neighbourhoods, the spoken language has changed over the centu-
ries between Italian, Armenian, Greek, Portuguese, and Kabyle, but what has remained 
the same is their reputation among many Marseillais as being a lost part of the city in-
vaded by foreigners. See Vacher, as in fn. 11.
37 Like many other cities Marseille has an entire industry devoted to preventing tourists 
from running out of sights to see, specialties to taste, treasures to be found, and land-
scapes to be explored. See Marseille Tourisme. 11. 10. 2018. URL: http://www. marseille 
-tourisme.com/fr/.
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prosperity. In all cases, the desired city stands out as an object: as a whole 
consisting of parts to be taken grasped, and experienced as such.
The temporality folding into the conquerors’ object relation is manifested as 
expectations and desires to be met. Thus, conquerors come to conquer and 
to collect expected treasures that prior to their arrival made them desire the 
city in the first place. What the treasures consist of, however, is not necessar-
ily very tangible. To some the treasure consist of new memories, souvenirs, or 
booty to be brought home, to others the treasure takes the form of a pleasant 
break from home and everyday life, while to immigrants the treasures to be 
found are opportunities for establishing a new life in a new place. Thus, the 
kind of object the city constitutes to the conqueror depends on its ability to 
live up to the expectations, the rumors, the promises and the advertisements 
by which it has been made desirable. To what degree the city is able to do so, 
can only be determined through authentic experience.
Which Condition makes the City a City?
What stands out in the examples above, are the ways in which distance and 
opposition are required for the city to be deciphered as an object. In other 
words, they form a condition that enables the object relation. This condition 
is not only spatial. As we have seen, object relations also imply decryptions 
by which temporal horizons are folded into the experience of something 
(perceptions cf. Lefebvre) as an object. Without this condition, there is noth-
ing to conceive, nothing to monitor or maintain, and nothing to conquer. This 
is not to say that whatever constitutes an object disappears when distance 
and opposition are absent, but it no longer constitutes an object. The house 
in the city is still a house, the order of the city is still an order, the monument 
is still a monument, and the city beneath Notre Dame de la Garde is still a 
city. But they are not objects – not until they are thrown in the way or put 
before someone to be decrypted as creation, responsibility, or temptation.
When cities are not objects, then what are they? This is a question we can-
not answer within the bounds of the object relation. As stated above, objects 
become objects under a certain condition. Thus, following Heidegger’s ap-
proach, the next question helping us forward could be the following:
What is a Condition?
According to the Danish philosopher Søren Kierkegaard, a ›condition‹ can be 
described as an ›engulfing situation‹. Unlike phenomena, which one stands 
before or against as objects, ›condition‹ is something one ›is‹ or ›is in‹. In 
›The Sickness Unto Death‹ Kierkegaard addresses the nature of conditions
through the example of illness: »Then the illness sets in, and from that in-
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stant it affirms itself and is now an actuality, the origin of which recedes more 
and more into the past«.38
Conditions, including the object relation, are born out of the occurrence of 
the condition itself. I am being opposed, I am being confronted, I am falling 
ill, but before I am being, getting, or falling, the conditions do not exist.
Conditions can be volatile and passing or sticky and confining. They can vary 
from unnoticed to overwhelming and from constructive and life giving to 
destructive and deadly. Some can coexist, merge, and presuppose each other. 
Others conflict, undermine and destroy each other. Everyone and everything, 
including cities, is in a ›condition‹.
Regardless of their differences, Kierkegaard argues, all conditions are ›set‹ 
by occurrence: engulfing and inseparable from who or whatever is ›in‹ 
them.39 Although conditions are inseparable from what is in them, it does 
not mean that whatever is in a condition stays in that condition forever. As 
we saw in the case of objects, what is an object may cease to be so. This is the 
case with all conditions. They cease to exist when they are abandoned, after 
which they dissolve into memories or vanish into oblivion. Once we leave the 
conditions behind, there are no oppositions, confrontations, or illnesses lying 
around waiting for us.
Admittedly, conditions are elusive. Just as distance and opposition can be 
present without catching our attention when facing an object, other condi-
tions may very well be at play around us without catching our attention. With 
this in mind, how can we identify conditions?
A way forward regarding this challenge lies in a distinction between con-
dition and essence. According to Kierkegaard, conditions are engulfing and 
›set‹, they begin and they end,40 while essence is different: it pervades.41 In
other words, it runs through and transcends.
Although we may have difficulty noticing conditions when we are in them, 
we can pay attention to what happens when they change. Because they are 
conditions for who, how, and what we are, their beginnings and endings will 
inevitably make a difference to us in some way. This difference does not nec-
essarily threaten the existence of who or what is undergoing that change. We 
may change, but unless the change destroys us, we are still who we are. This 
may seem paradoxical, but keeping the distinction between condition and 
essence in mind, we can determine what changes and what stays the same. 
Change is a change of condition while essence is what makes the changed 
remain what it is. In other words, what undergoes change must do so in ac-
cordance with its essence.
38 Søren Kierkegaard: The Sickness Unto Death. Princeton 1941 [1849].
39 Ibid., p. 13.
40 Ibid.
41 Heidegger, as in fn. 2, p. 3.
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That which Stays the Same
If we approach changes as the ends of old conditions and the beginnings of 
new ones, we can now apply Heidegger’s questioning approach to explore 
concrete experiences of change in the way the city emerges.
To address this issue, I will return to what happened, when I left my object 
relation to Marseille at Notre Dame de la Garde.
»After a while, I went down from Notre Dame de la Garde and into the 
city, where I was absorbed in a swirl of people, cars, buildings, sounds, 
and smells.«
Compared to the object relation captured in my picture, the condition in 
which Marseille appeared as a city clearly changed. In this new condition, 
the city no longer emerged as an entity or object – it was no longer a thing as 
in something,42 and neither did it set temporal horizons by projecting itself 
onto imagined futures or experienced pasts. From being an object lying be-
fore me to be grasped (conquered) through future research, the city in this 
changed condition seemed to have almost lost its bounds and to dissolve into 
many things.
If what I experienced as a city has changed, how then can I argue that it has 
stayed the same?
What we are looking for is not the city as people, the city as buildings, the city 
as cars, the city as sounds, smells etc. That would be to repeat the mistake of 
confusing the essence of tree (treeness) with a tree, or falsely locating it in 
parts of a whole such as in roots, leaves, or trunks.43
Following Heidegger, the essence of the city emerging when I descended 
from Notre Dame de la Garde did not emerge ›as‹ many things, sounds and 
smells, but ›in‹ many things, sounds and smells. Therefore, the difference 
between experiencing the city as an object before me and the city as many 
things around me at the same time does not imply that the essence pervad-
ing the object before me or the many things around me has changed.
Again, it seems, we have reached a banal conclusion, namely that cities are 
cities, but change their appearance depending on from where and in which con-
dition we experience them. In other words, even if Marseille changes from 
being an object when we stand above it into many things, sounds, and smells 
when we are surrounded by it, what appears is of course still Marseille. 
Should we ever doubt that, we can always return to the position at Notre 
Dame de la Garde and compare it with pictures we have taken in the past.
As we have already discussed regarding objects, regardless of how we ex-
perience the city and regardless of what condition it seems to be in, what 
we experience is not and cannot be its essence. It may be crowded, vibrant, 
42 Cf. Lefebvre, as in fn. 24.
43 Eames/Goode, as in fn. 13.; Heidegger as in fn. 2.
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deserted, decaying, flourishing, etc., but none of these conditions can be iso-
lated as the essence of the city. This, however, does not imply that the essence 
is not there! In fact, like the ›treeness‹ of trees, the essence of the city has to 
be present in every version of it.
This insight indicates a way forward. We started the enquiry by addressing 
the distinction between anthropology ›in‹ and ›of‹ the city.44 By questioning 
it, we came to see the distinction between the two as matter of favoring a 
specific condition, namely the object relation. The condition we experienced 
was ›set‹45 by the city put before us as a ›something‹46 laying beneath the hill-
top from where it was captured and transformed into the version presented 
in the picture.
As a final example, I will present a condition in which the city reveals itself, 
›set‹ not by the distance and opposition of the object relation, but by a buzz-
ing presence, an eagerness to touch, smell and even taste. In fact, what char-
acterizes this condition is that it tends to evade or circle around the bounds 
of distance and opposition – even when we try to capture it within them. In 
other words, it resists becoming an object. I have labeled this condition ›the 
swarm‹.
Into the Swarm
The crowd of people walking the streets or crossing the squares of the city in 
a vibrant flow constitutes a classic and recognizable urban phenomenon. In 
and out of the many border shops found in the narrow streets of Marseille, 
thousands of potential customers are assessing, more or less consciously, the 
potential of getting caught in object relations that lead to the acquisition 
of commodities and services. Some are carefully exploring, others quickly 
browsing, some critically assessing, and some are easily seduced. Experi-
enced from within, it seems like an almost shapeless and intangible pres-
ence of life and noise coming from everywhere.
Like conceivers, janitors, and conquerors, swarming individuals are readers 
of the city. They read its advertisements, its potentials, its opportunities, its 
threats and its dangers. And like the object relation, swarming is a form of 
condition relating to the city – but unlike the former, it happens in motion. 
Swarmers do not stand still against the city, they navigate, evade, and they 
move in and around it. By doing so, the city becomes something else. What it 
becomes is simultaneously:
1) A condition for the swarming to swarm (here are potentials to be 
exploited, journeys to be travelled, dangers to be avoided, and chal-
lenges to be overcome – in other words, the city is locatable).
44 Eames/Goode, as in fn.13.
45 Kierkegaard, as in fn. 38.
46 Lefebvre, as in fn. 24.
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And:
2) A condition in which the swarming can swarm (it becomes a land-
scape in which there is room for swarming and appears accessible, 
evadable, escapable, readable, exploitable, and consumable – in other 
words, the city is swarmable).
If the swarm, as I stated above, is a condition in which the city can reveal 
itself, how then does it make sense to think of the city as a condition for 
the swarm? Following Kierkegaard, stating that the city is a condition would 
imply that it is ›set‹ by the occurrence of the city itself and that it will disap-
pear, if abandoned by the swarm. On the one hand, this of course is not the 
case. The city is still a city when the swarm goes to sleep. But, if we take a 
closer look, we will see that the city is in fact to some degree dependent on 
the swarm.
The swarm consumes, circulates, exploits, and pollinates the city. It enables 
exchange, businesses, and livelihoods. It produces waste, congestion, and 
noise. It follows and violates rules and regulations. It increases and reduces 
intensity. It is sensitive to conditions, like the weather or the time of day. It 
stays indoors when it rains or snows. It goes to sleep. It leaves the streets 
empty or fills them up with noises, smells, sounds and moving bodies.
In other words, the swarm changes the city. One could go so far as to argue 
that the swarm is not only a condition in the city, but also a condition for the 
city.
How does discovering that the city reveals itself ›in‹ the swarm as a condition 
›for‹ the swarm bring us closer to understanding what makes the city a city? 
Following Kierkegaard, everything, including cities and swarms, is in condi-
tions. There is no way for anything to exist or reveal itself without being in a 
condition. Clearly, the city is not a swarm and the swarm is not a city, but by 
exploring their interdependency as conditions shaping each other, we get a 
sense of something pervading the swarm as well as the city. This ›something‹ 
confined in mutual conditions is not an object or a condition itself, but of a 
pervasive nature, appearing in both conditions as what makes them what 
they are. It is what makes the swarm urban and what makes the urban recog-
nizable in the swarm.
So what Makes a City a City?
By following the question ›what makes a city a city?‹, we have made a jour-
ney from objects bound in distance and opposition into engulfing conditions. 
On that journey, we have identified traces and resonances, which, arguably, 
count as experiences pointing to an essence pervading the city as city. Al-
though we have not, and could not, encounter the essence of the city outside 
its many confinements through questioning, we have explored how the city 
takes on bounds and makes them its own. Thus, we have traced the essence 
of the city in the ways it takes on conceivers, janitors, and conquerors and 
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makes them its own by getting in their way as an object demanding attention. 
Furthermore, we have sensed the essence of the city inside the swarm, per-
vading it as a ›condition for‹ the swarming to swarm.
Maybe this sensation is the closest we can get to uncover the essence of the 
city.
We sense the city in its capability of emerging as objects and conditions: 
When it emerges in visions, conceivers have laid out for it to become; when 
it emerges in the order and systems the janitors struggle to restore it to; in 
the treasures taken away by its conquerors; in the daily lives of citizens when 
they shop, swarm, work, and engage with each other in the city.
These emergences, however, are easily mistaken. The city is more than we 
can dream, more than we can control, and more than we can desire. As Heid-
egger argues in his lecture on technology, we may lead ourselves to believe 
that the city’s compliance is due to our mastery of it. This arrogance, he warns, 
is dangerous. Instead, what I have attempted in this paper is to build a path 
paved not with mastery and dominance, but with questioning. As a path, it is 
not a fixed position. It is neither ›in‹ nor ›of‹ (in this paper we have passed 
both positions), but, as I hope to have demonstrated, it holds the potential of 
bringing us closer ›towards‹ the city.
We have not yet reached it, but along our path, the city has called to us, giv-
ing us indications of an endless number of objects and conditions in which 
traces of its essence can be encountered. We have followed a few of these 
invitations by the city (a picture and a swarm), but to the attentive there 
are so many more ways to become acquainted with it. While the examples 
in this paper were chosen because of their illustrative potential, what lies 
ahead could soon turn out to be of a far more serious nature. Not all objects 
are as easily taken and shared as pictures and not all conditions are as vol-
untary and pollinating as the swarm. My hope is that a sensitivity towards 
its essence will potentially save us from imposing ideas, orders, and object 
relations onto the city, impositions that the city is incapable of emerging from 
or that force it to reject and resist us by emerging as dangerous obstacles or 
undermining conditions.
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